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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CANE 
This is an action brought by 33-40, Inc., and 1lix otit, 
owners of real property within the Hunter-tlrangl·r l'lai; 
ning District in Salt Lake County, :State of Uah, again~· 
the Salt Lake County Building Inspector, Planniii: 
Commission and Commissioners, seeking an injuncti1n 
restraining the defendants from issuing building lH'l'lltii, 
or permitting construction of commercial buildings ii 
violation of the terms and provisions of the applica!J], 
zoning ordinance and the R-2 classification tlwrcof, gor 
erning the use of property owned by intervenors in ~ai,] 
planning district at the location of approximately 27U11 
\Vest and 3500 South, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
To avoid confusion in this brief, the seven plaintift'. 
appellants will be ref erred to as 35-40, Inc., et al., ina~­
much as 35-40, Inc. is a major property owner. The <lr-
fendant-respondents will be ref erred to as Building lll 
spector, et al., and intervenor-respondents will be re-
ferred to as Doxey-Layton Co., et al., inasmuch as DoHy 
Layton <Co. is the principal intervenor. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COUR'l1 
At the hearing on the Motion of 35-40, Inc., et al. f11r 
a Temporary Restraining Order (R. 12-14), DoxP)-
Layton 1Co., et al. were permitted to intervene and th1 
Court requested that legal argument be made bdore a11\ 
testimony was received. (R. 128) During the legal arg\! 
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iii' 11 1, I lo.'\1·y-Laytou ( 'o., et al., moved the Court to dis-
1111,,, tlic l'Olllplaiut of 35-40, lne., et al., and at the conclu-
,1,1n of tlw argmrn·ut, 35-40, Ine., et al. moved the Court 
11,, a su11rniary judgment on their l\lotion for a Tempo-
i ar>· HPstrnining Onler. At the conclusion of the argu-
llll'lll::i ui" eounsel and before any substantial evidence 
liad lit'l'l1 introdtwed and before 35-40, Inc., et al. were 
!!J\'l'll any opportunity to be heard in n•gard to the issu-
,uH'l' or a k11qJorary injunction, the District Court grant-
l'd the motion of Doxey-Layton Co., et al., to dismiss the 
cuwplaint of 35--±0, Inc., et al. and denied the motion of 
:l3-·W, Inc., et al., for summary issuance of a restraining 
ur1h'r.\R. U7, 98) ;)5--±0, Inc., et al., appeal from such judg-
lilPnt. 
RELIEF 80UGHT ON APPEAL 
:35-40, Inc., Pt al. seek reversal of the District Court's 
Urcler dismissing their ·Complaint and reversal of the 
I lrclPr denying their .Motion for the summary issuance 
or a Temporary Restraining Order pursuant to their 
i11•t1tion. 35-40, lnc., et al. further request that the Build-
ing luspedor, et al. be summarily restrained during the 
p1,rnlP1H·)· of this action, from issuing permits to Doxey-
Laytlln Co., et al. or allowing construction of buildings 
111 rn>lation of the terms of the applicable zoning ordi-
llllllet• and H-:.! classification thereof governing the premi-
'<'s invoked. 
Jn t hP PVent this Court reverses the District Court 
111 i1n. whPrPhy the complaint was dismissed but should 
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be unwilling, on the record as it now stands, to rtr,. 1, 
the Order of the District Court denying tlte ltlotion 'n 
35-40, Inc., et al. for the slllumary issuance of a T\·mpr, 
rary Restraining Order, then in that event, :35--±0, lnl'., 
et al. seek to have the 1Court remand this matter to tli" 
District Court with instructions to proceed ·with a hL·arrn" 
" on the motion of 35-40, Inc., et al. for a 'l'emporary ]1 1 
straining Order. 
In any event, the District Court should be instructh! 
to proceed to a trial on the complaint of 35-40, Inc., et al.. 
whereby a permanent injunction is sought. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
'The issue involved in this appeal stems from an ex 
tended and involved zoning procedure and hearings an<l 
litigation in connection therewith; therefore, to see the 
issue in its proper perspective it becomes necessary in the 
following statement of facts to set forth at length the 
history and background of the case giving rise to the issnr 
now before this Court. 
Doxey-Layton 1Co., et al. own real property in the 
Hunter-Granger Planning District in Salt Lake County. 
Utah. (R-1, 153-154) For several years Salt Lake County 
has been conducting studies and holding hearings to enart 
a well-plannt:>d zoning ordinance for the Hunter-Grangrr 
Planning District, which would enable that area to l1a\' 1 
an orderly development and preserve tlw valuPs of tli 1 
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" 1 ,, 111 .ity tlwn•u1. A Zoning Ordinarn'.l' was finally en-
;ll ti·d 011 or about February 12, 19G5, which Ordinance 
,,, 1Jt·d tlw prntwrty that is in dis1rnte herein of Doxey-
La>t011 Co., d al. for rPsidential use, H-2 classification, 
,1 hH It do1·~ not pl~rrni t commercial buildings, regional 
,;hopping tl•nters or any other commercial use. The 
;'.i1 11 ing Ordinanee provided for a regional shopping 
,.,. 11 t1·r and zonPd the property now owned by 35-±0, Inc. 
t'ur that use. 
Bt>(·atrne of the time involved in holding hearings, 
\'tr·., ~alt Lake County, on December 18, 1963, under the 
1 1r0Yi~ioni' of Title 17, Chapter 27, Section 19, Utah Code 
.\nnuiated, l!);J;), promulgated zoning regulations of a 
Mnporary nature to continue in effect for a six-months 
pPriod, to June 18, 19G-±. (R. 155-156) On March 28, 
1%..J., while the temporary zoning regulations were in ef-
il'ct, Doxc>y-Layton Co., et al. filed an application for a 
lmil<lir~g lWrrnit for the construction of commercial-type 
hnildings in a ~hopping center arrangement. (R. 158) 
~aid pdition was denied on the grounds the temporary 
wnmg regulation would not permit such construction. 
Tltl·n·after, on :May 2, 196±, which was still within the 
iH'riod of the temporary zoning regulations, Doxey-
La~-t()n ( 'o., et al., ading as aforesaid, petitioned for an-
other building permit to construct commercial-type build-
1ni::-~ 1n (·onnPdion with a regional shopping center. (R. 
l :,~)) ( )n ~[ay 23, 196-1-, still "'ithin the period of tempo-
':1n zuni11g rt>gulatiom;, the Building Inspector again 
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denied this second application, on the ground that t),. 
temporary zoning regulations would not 1H·n11it :sui-J.. 
(R. 159) Thereafter, Doxey-Layton Co., et al., ap1Jc·ah 
from the decision of May 23, 1%4, denying its appli('u. 
tion. On the appeal, the decision of .May 23, 19G-t, wa.-
sustained. ( R. 159) As a result of their loss on appc·al. 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al. brought an action in the Di:stri('t 
Court of Salt Lake County, Civil No. 152766, seeking tv 
require the Building Inspector to give them a lmildi11 ,, ~ 
permit to construct commercial buildings. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Ferdinand 
Erickson, sitting as one of the judges of the Third Judi-
cial District Court. During the trial, Doxey-Layton Co .. 
et al. contended that a second zoning ordinance of a 
temporary nature, enacted by the Salt Lake County Com-
mission on June 19, 1964 (which was after intervenors' 
application for a building permit had been denied by tht 
Commission but before the appeal of that decision had 
been finally decided) was improper and void. (R. 156) 
On February 24, 1965, the Honorable Ferdinand Erickson 
decided the case and ordered that an extraordinary \\ rit 
be issued, requiring the Building Inspector of Salt Lake 
County to consider and process the application of Doxey-
Layton Co., et al., without reference to the use of the land. 
( R. 162-165) The writ was issued the following day. 
February 25, 1965. (R. 166-168) 
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Hiuldiug lnspedor, et al. aJYpealed to the 8upreme 
l'uurt l'rOlll said order and while the appeal was pending, 
!Jo:-o.<·y-Laytou Co., et al. obtained a building permit, No. 
f:lJ ~0, for the eom;truction of "footings and foundations 
1111 1~ t'or Building C." (Exhibit P-4) Following the is-
~uarn·e of _Permit No. E3189, Doxey-Layton Cq., et al., o" t 1 I e ~- v.'; t tc tN'. ') u I' ..,,._ "- C •. , rt c T Ll"2.-
19G5, ~xhihit P 1) On the seeond day of Augast, 
:-ltak of Utah a Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Mootness, 
C"ontPllding that "said permit is the building permit re-
frnwi to and cont<>mplated by the extraordinary writ in 
th<' natnre of mandamus issued herein on February 25, 
1%5." (Exhibit P-1) On the second day of August, 
1905, the Supreme Court heard the motion and entered 
thP following minute entry: 
"Upon motion of plaintiff, that the appeal 
be dismissed, being represented by counsel for 
both parties that the defendants have complied 
with the writ of mandate and the matter is moot, 
and upon stipulation of counsel that the appeal 
is to be dismissed, it is hereby dismissed." (Exhi-
bit P-2) 
Notwithstanding the fact that Doxey-Layton Co., 
et al. stipulated that the permit issued was the one con-
tem1Jlated by the writ of mandamus, and that the writ 
had been complied with, Doxey-Layton Co., et al. con-
tinues to apply and threatens to continue to apply for 
additional building permits for the construction of com-
rnereial-t~ pt> buildings on its property in the area zoned 
R-2 elassi fication, which does not permit commercial 
buildings. ( H. 122) 
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·when 35-40, Inc., et al. learned of the intenti(ln~ 1, 1 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al., after the dismissal of thl' llJ 
peal, to obtain additional building pennits, 33-40, lne., 1,1 
al. brought this action in the District Court as prupnt: 
owners in the Hunter-Granger Planning District, se(·kiii:: 
the Court to restrain Building Inspector, et al. frui:, 
issuing any more building permits contrary to th(' wnin~ 
ordinance. 
Included in the complaint of 35-40, Inc., et al., wa~ ~' 
petition for a '11 emporary Restraining Order to restrai11 
Building Inspector, et al. from issuing any permits dur-
ing the pendency of this action. (R. 12-14) 
Near the commencement of the hearing, Aldon .J. 
Anderson, one of the judges of the Third Judicial Di~­
trict Court, requested the parties to present legal argu-
ments before the presentation of any testimony. (R. 12~1 
However, prior to the legal arguments, several docmrwnb 
had been introduced and received in evidence. (Exhibit~ 
1, 2, and 4) In the presentation of its legal argunwnt. 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al. made a motion to dismiss 35--±11, 
Inc., et al.'s complaint, and following the argument, 35-111. 
Inc., et al, moved the Court for a summary judgmPnt 1111 
its motion for a temporary restraining order. Judgl 
Anderson, after hearing legal argument and without 
permitting any testimony, granted the motion of Doxey 
Layton Co., et al. to dismiss the complaint of :):-1--±11. 
Inc., et al. and denied the motion of 35-40, Inc., !'! al 
for summary judgment. 35-40, Inc., et al. now app"al 
from Judge Anderson's order. 
9 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
:15-40, INC., ET AL., AS OWNERS OF REAL PROPERTY 
1\ITl!IN THE DISTRICT, ARE ENTITLED BY STATUTE 
ni BRING THIS ACTION TO ENJOIN BUILDING INSPEC-
TOR, ET AL. FROM ISSUING BUILDING PERMITS CON-
TRARY TO THE ZONING ORDINANCE. 
Title 17, Chapter 27, Section 23, Utah Code Anno-
talt>d, 1933, provides in part as follows: 
" ... In case any building or structure is or 
is proposed to be erected, constructed, recon-
structed, altered, maintained or used, or any land 
is or is proposed to be used in violation of this 
act or of any regulation or provision of any reso-
lution, or amendment thereof, enacted or adopted 
by any board of county commissioners under the 
authority granted by this act, such board, the 
<listrirt attorney or the county, or any owner of 
real estate within the district in which such build-
ing, structure or land is situated, may, in addition 
to otht•r remedies, provided by law, institute in-
junction, mandamus, abatement or any other ap-
propriate action or actions, proceeding or pro-
<"PPdings, to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove 
~neh unlawful Prection, construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration, maintenance or use." (emphasis 
addt>d) 
Thl• above-quoted statute is explicit in providing 
1Jw.1 own<>rs of real estate within the district may bring 
;111 ad ion to enjoin and even abate or remove any building 
" 1 ~trnd1m• and may enjoin any building that is pro-
10 
posed, when such are in violation of the applirnblt' zun 111 
ordinances. As owners of real property, 35--1-0, ln<'., 1.1 ~ 1 1 
are specifically granted a right to bring an action n11 1 
only to enjoin but if necessary abate and remow am 
unlawful erection, construction, reconstruction, ultr·rn-
tion, maintenance, or use of property in tlw Plannin1• 
~ 
District. 
Neither the temporary zoning regulations in df(·r·i 
at the time Doxey-Layton Co., et al. made applicat1flii 
for a building permit, nor the final zoning ordinanet> l'll· 
acted Fedruary 12, 1965, which is now applicable, perrnii 
the construction of commercial buildings or shoppin!:'. 
center arrangement on the property of Doxey-Layton Cu., 
et al. For Building Inspector, et al. to issue a vennit for 
the construction of commercial buildings or a shoppin!' 
center would be in violation of the zoning ordinances and 
would be the very act which Title 17 of the Utah Code 
permits 35-40, Inc., et al. as owners of real property to 
enJom. 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al. contend that the writ of 
mandate signed by Judge Erickson on February 2-l-, 19G;i 
supersedes the zoning ordinance and requin.•s Building 
Inspector, et al. to consider and process its application 
without consideration of land and building usage. (H-lGll 
However, such contention is now without merit by n·a· 
son of the subsequent order of the Supreme Court of 
tlw State of Utah, finding: 
11 
"That defrndants (Building Inspector, et al.) have 
t·un1plit'd with the writ of mandate and the mat-
ter is moot." (Exhibit P-2) 
.\~ !i!'ld in Christie vs. Morris, 119 l\Iont. 383, 176 P. 2d 
I )I )L), l)( );\ : 
"lt is a well-established rule ... that the 
records of a court of justice, including the record 
of a judgment, import absolute verity; and no one, 
whether or not a party to the proceeding in which 
they were made, may in a collateral proceeding 
impeach them by adducing evidence in denial of 
the facts of which they purport to be a memorial." 
Tlw Supreme Court of Montana went on in that case 
to romment in regard to the party that was trying to 
take an inconsistent position to a prior decree: 
". . . he cannot complain that the Court did 
\vhat he asked it to do. . ." 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al. are likewise bound by the 
.Judicial order of the Utah Supreme Court which they 
pmmred, which found that the writ of mandate had been 
<·n111plied with by the issuance of the single building per-
1111t Xo. E::H89, and they cannot now complain that the 
( rJUrt found just what they asked the Court to find. vVith 
thP writ of mandate satisfied, the zoning ordinances in 
rr·iuinl lo the Hunter-Granger Planning District remain 
in full fon~(~ and effect without any exceptions thereto, 
<Lll(l :;;J--10, Inc., et al. as property owners are entitled to 
:illllJ: thi:- action to enjoin the construction of commercial 
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buildings or the use of the prorwrty in tlH• Plan11rnµ JJ,, 
trict in violation of such zoning ordinances beyond tk, 
contemplated by the single Permit No. 318!J. 
POINT NO. II 
DOXEY-LAYTON CO., ET AL. BY THEIR STTPlJLATIO:i 
THAT THE WRIT OF l\IANDATE HAD BEEN COl\IPLlEJ 
WITH, WHICH WAS FINALIZED IN THE ORDER OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF UT AH, ARE ESTOPPED FROl\I NO\\ 
TAKING AN INCONSISTENT POSITION. 
The essential issue now before the Court in tlu~ 
appeal is the consequences that flow from the dism1:,,ai 
of the appeal of Case .No. 152766 which Doxey-La~·tiq; 
Co., et al. procured. rrhere can be no doubt what tl11i,, 
consequences are when the said dismissal and thP ua~i.' 
for the same are examined. 
In Exhibit P-1, which is a copy of Intervenors' ,\Jo. 
tion to Dismiss Appeal for Mootness, together with 
affidavit and memorandum in support of said motwli 
in said Civil Case 152766, Graham \V. Doxey of Doxt>) 
Layton 1Co., et al., referring to Permit No. E3189 for 
footings and foundations only for Building C, statt'tl 
under oath: 
" ... that said permit is the building permit rf· 
ferred to and contemplated by the extraor<linarr 
writ in the nature of mandamus issued herein 01: 
February 25, 1965." 
In the l\fc>morandum of Anthorities, Doxey-Layton Co .. 
et al. stated on Pagl' 2 in part : 
-
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.. By is::ming the permit, defendant-appellants 
r BuilJing lnsvector, et al.) eliminated any con-
troversy . . . " 
::iid (, 11 1'ages ;-) and G of the Memorandum Doxey-Layton 
1. ()., .. t al. further stated: 
.. Following issuance of the writ, defendant-
apiH·llants (Building Inspector, et al.) took no 
action of any kind to stay its effective force, and 
ohPdienee was therefore required. The defendant-
appPllants did obey and issued.the building permit 
authorizing the construction of the shopping cen-
tPr ... 'l'he writ has been obeyed, the judgment 
carried out to this point ... Whatever the decision 
of this court may be as to the judgment, it cannot 
restoro the status quo of the parties, the judgment 
has been complied with, and the appeal proceed-
ings are therefore moot." (Exhibit P-1) 
Tltt> above representations by Doxey-Layton Co., 
··t al. Plicifrd a deh~rmination by the Supreme Court as 
follows: 
"l1 pon motion of plaintiffs that the appeal be 
dismissL·d, and it being represented by counsel 
for both parties that defendants have complied 
with the writ of mandate and the matter is moot, 
and upon stipulation of counsel that the appeal be 
clismissed, it is lwreby dismissed." (Exhibit P-2) 
At the hL'aring of the instant case in the District 
( ·,,nrt, Dox1·y-Layton Co., et al. took an entirely incon-
·1't"11t position ·with the above allegations, culminating 
)J tli1· abo\-P-stated order of the Supreme Court. During 
i] (· hParing. Mr. Mc:Murray for 35-40, Inc., et al. asked 
1li1· fo]](,,,·ing question to counsel for Doxey-Layton Co., 
1 al. and n·c·ein'd the following answer: 
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"'Mr. Worsley (who relJresents Doxey-La\\•,; 
Co., et al.), do you on behalf of your dient~ ·~ 11 
any other permit similar to ::H8~, which you ~ 11 ~ 
the issuance of, any further n•ceipt and p1·nlli\, 
from the Salt Lake County Planning, Zonin<r aiiil 
Building Department, other than 3189 '!' '' I°' 
".Mr. \Vorsley: 'Your Honor, making it cn~tai 
clear, we will seek quite a substantial nm1il1;,1 111 
supplemental permits .... '" (R-122) 
The principle of estoppel has long been establislH·d 
m the law and prohibits such inconsistent position~ a' 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al. are attempting to tah. Th 
broad principle is stated in 31 1C.J.S. 5±8, undPr tlw ~ec 
tion entitled "Estoppel": 
"The doctrine of equitable estoppel preclud~; 
a person from maintaining a position or attitud1 
inconsistent with another position or attitnd1· 
which is sought to be maintained at the sauw tim1, 
or which was asserted at a previous time." 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated tlH• prineipl1• in 
the case of Tanner v. Provo Reservoir Company, 76 Utah 
335, 289 P. 151, 154 as follows : 
" ... The doctrine of estoppel requires of a 
party consistencey of conduct, when inconsistrnr' 
would work substantial injun' to the otlwr party." 
The Utah Supreme Court went on to say in tl1e 
same case that fraud or intent to deceive did not haw 
to be found before estoppPl could be apvliecl. 'l'IH' Court 
stated: 
15 
"This Court in Hilton v. Sloan, 37 lTtah 359, 108 
P. fi~9, W-t, became committed to the doctrine 
that : 'l t is not necessary that in all cases and 
1111Jt>r all circumstances there must be shown an 
a dual inkntion to deceive in order (to) es top a 
iwrson'." 
Tht> rtah ~upreme Court went on to hold in the 
abow stated Tanner case that the appellant was estopped 
lu claim a right which he obviously had under a deed for 
din:rnion of water at one point by reason of his acts and 
n·quests over a period of time before the action that 
tilt· water be diverted to him from another point not 
authorized under the deed. 
The doctrine of estoppel as it applies directly to 
tl1P instant matter is stated in 31 C.J.S. 610 as follows: 
"An estoppel may come into existence because of 
the conduct or action of a person in a court and 
it is generally recognized that a party who has 
knowingly and deliberately assumed a particular 
position in judicial proceedings is estopped to 
assu11w a position inconsistent therewith to the 
prejudice of the adverse party. Accordingly, it 
hat> frt>quently been stated that where a party 
assumPs a certain position in a legal proceeding 
and succeeds in maintaining that position, he 
may not thereafter, simply because his interests 
han~ changed, assume a position to the contrary, 
t>SpPcially if it is to the prejudice of the party who 
has aeqnit>sced in the position formerly taken by 
him." 
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A case directly in point with the uuon-stal1·d 1,r 11 , 
ciple and with the facts in the instant mattl'l' is tliL· ('Ct-
of Porter v. Oklahoma Baco11e College TntL-;t, J4-fi (> ~. 
328, 333-33-1: (Okla.). The case involved an aneillary 111" 
bate proceedings in Oklahoma wltL'l'('in one Mr. ]>01·t, 1 
attempted to assert the validity of a codicil to a 1111 i 
.Mr. Porter had previously stipulated in a dowi<'tliar: 
probate proceedings in Texas that the codicil \rn:::; \'uid. 
Mr. Porter contended in the Oklahoma proceedings tlia' 
the codicil was valid on the theory that the time for 1,fi 
jecting to the validity of the codicil had pa:::;sed L~ Ja11. 
but the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that 1·r1·11 
though the time for objecting to the validity of th 
codicil had passed, l\lr. Porter, by his stipulation tl1a· 
the codicil was void in the prior proceedings in TPxa'. 
was estopped from asserting the validity of the codii·1: 
in the ancillary proceedings. 
Another case directly in point is the case of Jfar.i 
grove v. Bou·man, 10 \Vash. 2d 136, 116 P. 2d 33fi, 3:3~ 
The appellant in that case was insisting on appeal that 
he was entitled to damages for breaches under a contract 
which he had previously requested the court to hold in 
valid and unenforceablt>, which the court did. In rejccti11~ 
the appellant's claim the court held: 
"A litigant will not be heard to say in 011· 
breath that a contract is of no force or effret aii,i 
in the next assert a right to recover upon it. P 
may not def Pat his adv<•rsary's ('anst> on 111 • 
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t !won· that t!H· coutract is invalid and in the 
~allH' .or s11bs('qrn•nt action, claim any rights under 
it Tll(' agn•e11H•nt cannot bt• trPatPd as a nullity 
for 01w pnqJOS(~ and as a bin<ling eontract for 
anotlwr (<·itations omitted)." 
Lik<'\\ is<•, DoxPy-Layton Co., et al. cannot in the prior 
111.,11'l·1·ding-s alh•ge that tlw writ of mandate had been 
, .impli1•d ,,·ith and that the matter was moot and nothing 
11u th1·r had to be done, an<l then in this proceeding con-
knd that it is entitled to further building permits under 
tl1e 11Tit of man<late. See also the case of Christie v. 
llurris, lUl Mont. ::l8i1, 176 P. 2d GGO, GG3, where the ap-
Jil'1lirnt was contesting the title of a party to certain 
prnperty which appellant had in a previous proceeding 
j11incd in the partial distribution of the property to 
~uch party. The eourt held in part: 
''. . . it is not permissible for plaintiff who 
joined in the request for the order to now com-
plain that the court did what he asked it to do. It 
is a wdl established rule. . . that the records of 
a court of justice, including the record of judg-
rnmt, impart absolute verity; and no one, whether 
or not a lJarty to the proceeding in which they are 
1nade ma)' in a collateral proceeding impeach them 
liy adducing evidence in denial of the facts of 
whi('h tlwy purport to be a memorial." 
Tli\• <'OlHt continued on by stating: 
" ... hut ct>rtainly he cannot complain that the 
<·onrt did \\·hat he asked it to do, viz., distribute 
t lw prnperty to Morris." 
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'The principle of estoppel is applicable in the in~tant 
case even though Doxey-Layton Co., et al. clai1H they 
will lose rights they had under the writ of mandate, Jw. 
cause if they are granted additional building permits for 
commercial buildings 35-40, Inc., et al. will lose rights 
that they had as property owners. The procuring of the 
dismissal in said Case No. 152766 by Doxey-Layton Co., 
et al. by their representations that the writ of mandatr' 
was fully satisfied with the issuance of Permit No. E3189 
cut off all rights of the parties to correct any errors of 
the District Court in granting the writ of mandate. 
The Utah Supreme ,Court has stated the law that 
where a dilemma arises whereby one of two must suffer, 
the proper party to suffer the consequences is the one 
who has caused the circumstance. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in I. X. L. Stores Company v. Success 
Markets, 98 Utah 160, 97 P. 2d 677, 580: 
"When one of two innocent persons, each of 
whom is guiltless of an intentional moral wrong, 
must suffer a loss, it should be borne by that one 
of them who by his conduct has rendered th~ 
injury possible (citations omitted)." 
The court went on to hold: 
"The vital principle is, that he who by his lan-
guage or conduct, leads another to do what ht 
would not otherwise have done, shall not subject 
such a person to loss or injury by disappointing 
the expectations upon which he acted. Such .a 
change of position is sternly forbidden. 'Tlnf 
remedy is always applied so as to promote tl1e 
ends of justice ... " 
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Doxey-Layton Co., et al. is the party that knowingly 
k(l tilt> 8upreme Court of Utah to find in its order that 
tlw writ of mandate had been complied with. If injury 
urnst necessarily result from such finding, then Doxey-
Lavto11 Co. et al. and not innocent parties should bear . ' 
the rl':rnlt:s of the court ordPr they procured. 
POINT NO. III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN SUMMARILY DIS-
MISSING THE COMPLAINT OF 35-40, INC., ET AL. AT A 
HEARING ON A MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER WITHOUT RECEIVING ANY TESTIMONY AND 
WITHOUT HAVING A PROPER TRIAL OF THE ACTION. 
The District Court erroneously dismissed 35-40, 
Inc.'s complaint at the hearing on its motion for a 
temporary restraining order during the pendency of 
the action, without giving 35-40, Inc., et al. any oppor-
tunity to present testimony and other evidence, and 
without giving any consideration to the other matters 
requested in the complaint. The allegations contained 
in the complaint of 35-40, Inc., et al. and the circumstances 
involved in the case justified a full hearing. 
1
1
0 summarily turn 35-40, Inc., et al. out of court 
nnrfor the circumstances was contrary to well estab-
lbl1hl law. A good statement of the law is found in 
Lal'cre Kidman ct ux. v. Lavine H. White, et al., 14 
~~tali (2d) 1±2, 378 P. 2d 898, 900, where the Utah 
Nnvremp Court stated: 
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"ln confronting the problem presented on thi~ 
appeal we have been obliged to remain awarr' 
that a summary judgment, which turns a party 
out of court without an opportunity to present 
his evidence, is ·a harsh measure that should be 
granted only when, taking the view most favor 
able to a party's claim and any proof that might 
properly be adduced thereunder, he could in no 
event prevail." 
"See statement in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 
(2d) 289, 358 P. 2d 344 (1965)." 
As shown in the transcript, approximately half of 
the hearing was consumed by arguments in relation to 
Doxey-Layton Co., et al.'s Motion to Intervene. (R-109-
129) After Doxey-Layton Co., et al.'s Motion to Inter-
vene had been granted, the District tCourt, in relationship 
to 35-:40, Inc., et al.'s Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, stated: 
"I would rather hear legal argument first. lt 
may obviate then ecessity of testimony ... " (R-l~SJ 
As is shown in the remaining part of the transcript (R 
129-150) the District 1Court listened to arguments of 
counsel, by far the greater portion of which was eon-
sumed by counsel for Doxey-Layton Co., et al. 'l1he D1~ 
trict Court received no testimony, although witneHS1'' 
were present and available. 
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lt is apparent from the statements of the Court, 
on Page:,; 148 and 149 of the Record, that the District 
Court based its order dismissing the complaint of 35-40, 
inc., et al., on its erroneous conclusion that Doxey-Layton 
Co., et al. and Building Inspector, et al. mistakingly or 
for some other "ill-advised" reason, stipulated to the 
Supreme 1Court that the writ of mandate had been fully 
complied with by the issuance of Permit No. E3189 and 
that the matfor was moot and that the appeal should be 
dismissed. It appears that the District Court felt that the 
solution to the problem was to force the parties to go 
back to the Supreme Court and re-open the appeal, rather 
than hearing the issues as set forth in the complaint, 
and therefore dismissed the complaint of 35-40, Inc., et al. 
3G-40, Inc., et al. attempted to intervene and have 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah reinstate the 
ai)peal in Civil No. 152766, but their intervention was 
oppost•d hy Doxey-Layton Co., et al., and by Building 
lnspector, et al., and this Court denied 35-40, Inc., et al. 
the right to intervene in that proceeding. Neither Doxey-
Layton Co., et al., nor Building Inspector, et al., made 
any attempts to reinstate the appeal, even after the 
obvious error was brought to their attention. If Doxey-
Layton Co., et al. and Building Inspector, et al. desire, 
as they ariparently do, to stand on their representations 
lo the Supreme Court that Permit No. E3189 completely 
.satisfied the writ of mandate, and accept the benefits of 
i hP dismissal of the appeal, then they must also suffer 
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the consequences and 35-40, Inc., et al. as proprrty 
owners in the planning district with definite right~ b.\ 
statute should be permitted to pursue its action herei~ 
and present its testimony and evidence to substantiate 
its claim for a permanent injunction, restraining Build 
ing Inspector, et al. from issuing permits in violation 
of the applicable zoning ordinances. 
SUMMARY 
35-40, Inc., et al., as owners of real property, are 
granted a right by statute to bring this action to enjoin 
the violation of the zoning ordinances by Building In-
spector, et al. The contentions of Doxey-Layton Co., 
et al. that there is an exception to the zoning ordinance 
in the writ of mandate of the District Court is un-
founded because the order of the Utah Supreme 'Court 
which Doxey-Layton Co., et al. procured finds that 
said writ was satisfied by the issuance of the single 
Permit No. E3189. The resulting consequences are that 
the zoning ordinance applicable to the Hunter-Granger 
Planning District are in full force and effect withont 
any exceptions thereto. 
The complaint of 35-40, Inc., et al. clearly stated a 
cause of action and the District 1Court erred in dismi::;sing 
said complaint at the hearing on a motion for temporary 
restraining order without permitting the presentation 
of testimony or allowing a proper trial of the matters 
stated in the complaint. 
;{)--t(J, lnl'.., d al. are entitled to an order revers~ng 
tlll' Distrid Court's judgment dismissing its complaint, 
abo all order reversing the District Court's judgment 
dt:nrin"· thl' summary issuance of a temporary restrain-
• I:' 
ing urder as sought by 35-40, Inc. The record substan-
tiate~; tlw summary issuance of a temporary restraining 
order, restraining Building Inspector, et al. from issu-
ing building permits for commercial buildings contrary 
to the applicable zoning ordinances. The record also 
~uhstantiatcs a judgment in favor of 35-40, Inc., et al. 
vermanently enjoining Building Inspector, et al. from 
issuing building permits as above indicated, and that 
failing, the case should be remanded to the District 
Court for a proper trial of the matter. 
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